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Abstract
I show that the equilibrium derived in Gravelle and Sivey (2010) cannot hold for
rational consumers. I then partially characterize the continuum of possible equilibria
for rational consumers.
1 Introduction
In Gravelle and Sivey (2010) (GS from now on) the authors study a model of quality
choice where two firms (hospitals) compete for consumers (patients). Prices are fixed by
a regulator, so hospitals compete in qualities. Patients receive noisy but unbiased signals
of true qualities and decide where to purchase the service.
This note explains that GS implicitly assume that patients are irrational. For example,
Propositions 1,2, and 3 can only be derived for irrational consumers.1 The main reason for
this is the following. GS argue that patients should visit the hospital that they receive the
highest signal of quality from. This contradicts basic rationality if hospitals in equilibrium
choose different qualities, as they do for asymmetric hospitals. In this case, patients should
visit the hospital that is supposed to choose highest quality, regardless of their signals. For
all equilibrium signals, patients receive no information from signals and can safely ignore
them. This phenomena is closely related to the literature on imperfect observability and
first-mover advantage (Bagwell (1995) and Maggi (1999)).
I start with the description of the model. Then I show how rationality cannot describe
the behavior of patients in GS. Then I partially characterize the continuum of equilibria
that exist for rational consumers.
2 Model
Here I reproduce the model from GS.
There are two hospitals, H and L, with quality levels qH and qL, respectively. All
patients demand one unit of hospital care, and have to chose from which hospital to
purchase it.
1Parts of these propositions hold for rational consumers whenever δL = δH , but in this case propositions
describe one equilibrium out of a continuum.
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A patient receives a signal q˜j = qj + l for each hospital. Signal j is distributed uni-
formly over (−1/2v, 1/2v) where errors are independently distributed between hospitals.
Hospitals cannot change price, as they are fixed by a regulator, and only choose qual-
ities. The cost function of hospital j if it produces Dj units of quality qj is given by
cj(qj , D
j) = cDj +
1
2
δjq
2
j ,
where δj is a hospital-specific cost parameter of quality. Assume that δL ≥ δH > 0.
The timing is the following: hospitals simultaneously choose qH and qL, consumers
receive signals based on these quality choices and decide which hospital to visit. The
game ends after one period.
The solution concept use by GS is a stable [sic] Nash Equilibrium (NE). It shall
become evident soon that NE is not powerful enough for this game of both imperfect
and incomplete information. This is because patients do not observe quality choices of
hospitals, but they possess signals that hospitals do not know. Thus, it is natural to use,
the more restrictive, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept. By
doing so I will be able to restrict out-of-equilibrium play by patients. To some extent, GS
also use PBE as they require patients to form expectations of (beliefs on) quality using
their signals and make optimal decisions given their beliefs. It is the formation of these
expectations as described by GS that is inconsistent with rationality. I illustrate this point
next.
3 Irrational consumers
To solve the model GS makes the following claim:
“A patient has no prior information about hospital quality and so her expectation of
hospital quality after receiving information on quality is E[qj |q˜H , q˜L] = q˜j , j = H,L.”
I argue next that this statement cannot describe a decision process of a rational con-
sumer. To see the core of the problem, assume δL > (p − c)v2 and δL > δH . GS claim
that, in this case, Nash Equilibrium exists, is unique, and in equilibrium q∗H > q
∗
L (see
Proposition 1).
Now consider a patient who receives a signal q˜j ∈ [q∗j − 1/2v, q∗j + 1/2v]. According to
GS this patient should believe that hospital j’s quality is q˜j . But in fact, if the patient
is rational, for any q˜j ∈ [q∗j − 1/2v, q∗j + 1/2v] she should expect the quality of hospital j
to be q∗j and not q˜j .
2 This is because a rational patient should believe hospital j to play
according to the PBE if her signal q˜j does not indicate a deviation. Thus a rational patient
would completely discard her signal instead of using it as her estimate of qj . Instead, all
rational patients should visit hospital H which in equilibrium provides higher quality.
In contrast, according to GS, a subset of patients will visit hospital L because for these
patients q˜L > q˜H .
Based on the above, the equilibrium derived in GS cannot be correct for rational
patients. Only bounded-rational patients who cannot compute the equilibrium and thus
2The probability of q˜j = q
∗
j is zero.
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use their own signal as the best guess for hospitals’ qualities would use their signal instead
of their rational expectation of equilibrium quality.
By, what appears to be, a coincidence, for one case GS do find an equilibrium that
is consistent with patients’ rationality. When δL = δH , equilibrium qualities are equal,
so patients are indifferent between hospitals and thus can follow any strategy in choosing
between them. In particular, as GS require, Consumers can base their choices on which
signal is the highest. Moreover, when one of the hospitals, say hospital j, deviates to a
quality qj > q
∗, some patients receive signals in the interval (q∗ + 1/2v, qj + 1/2v] which
should never arrive in equilibrium. In PBE, rational patients with such signals have to
interpret their signal as proof of qj > q
∗ and should visit hospital j.3 This is indeed what
GS’s requirement that patients follow the highest signal achieves. Patients with signals in
(q∗ + 1/2v, qj + 1/2v] always receive higher signal from hospital j and thus always visit j.
So, for δL = δH , GS find an equilibrium of the model. However, there are more equilibria
(e.g. indifferent consumers can be split equally between hospitals instead of following the
highest signal). In the following section, I partially characterize possible equilibria of the
model and solve for the equilibrium where indifferent patients ignore equilibrium signals.
4 Equilibrium with rational patients
In this section I partially characterize equilibria of the game for rational consumers.
Assume patients expect hospitals to choose qualities q∗H and q
∗
L in equilibrium. From
the discussion of the previous section, it is clear that if both hospitals are to set positive
quality, they should receive positive demand. This in turn requires that hospitals choose
equal qualities.
Lemma 1. If q∗H > 0 and q
∗
L > 0, then q
∗
H = q
∗
L
Proof. Assume the opposite, so that q∗j > 0 for j = H,L, and q
∗
H 6= q∗L. Without loss of
generality, assume that q∗H > q
∗
L. In PBE all patients have to visit hospital H, and thus
L can set qL = 0 and increase its profit.
As a result of Lemma 1 there is a continuum of pure strategy equilibria in this model.
The reason is that consumers are indifferent between hospitals so they can base their
decisions on signals they receive. To determine equilibrium qualities one needs to consider
hospitals’ deviations. The profitability of such deviations will depend on how patients
react to signals, and thus equilibrium qualities can be rather arbitrary.
Lemma 1 leaves three possibilities. Either both hospitals choose the same non-zero
quality q∗, or one hospital chooses positive quality while the other one chooses zero quality,
or both hospitals choose zero quality. I discard the last possibility in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. If q∗H = q
∗
L = 0 can never hold in equilibrium
Proof. Assume the opposite so that q∗H = q
∗
L = 0. There should be a hospital J that does
not receive all the patients in equilibrium. Now consider a deviation by hospital j, to a
3Similar argument applies to deviations by j to lower quality.
3
small but positive quality . Due to this deviation, for hospital j some patients receive
signals in the interval (1/2v, 1/2v+ ]. These signals are not on the equilibrium path, thus
in PBE these patients should form their beliefs on qj . Belief qj = 0 is not consistent with
received signals. Whatever the beliefs, they should indicate that qj is positive, and since
the other hospital has not deviated and no patient receives an out-of-equilibrium signal
for it, all patients who receive signals in (1/2v, 1/2v + ] should visit j. The number of
such patients is linear in , while the cost of quality is quadratic in , so there will be small
enough  such that hospital j’s deviation is profitable.
We are left with two types of equilibria. Either both hospitals choose the same positive
quality, or one chooses zero quality and receives no patients. The latter can be constructed,
but is uninteresting because one of the hospitals is inactive.4
So the only natural case to consider is where both hospitals choose equal quality.
Denote this common quality by q∗. If qualities are equal, patients are indifferent in equi-
librium between the two hospitals. This allows patients to be allocated between hospitals
in an arbitrary way for all signals on the equilibrium path.5 This gives rise to a continuum
of possible q∗. This is because for each hospital, the choice of q should maximize profits,
but because for signals in the interval [q∗− 1/2v, q∗ + 1/2v] patients’ can base their choice
on signals in an arbitrary way, demand response to a deviation in quality is also arbitrary.
This means that various levels of q∗ can be sustained in equilibrium. Hence, GS provide
one possible equilibrium for δL = δH . To illustrate equilibrium multiplicity, I will provide
another, arguably more standard, equilibrium of the model with symmetric hospitals. It
seems to be very difficult, if not impossible, to construct such an equilibrium for asym-
metric (in cost) hospitals. In the next section it will become apparent that an equilibrium
for asymmetric hospitals does not exist if patients ignore equilibrium signals.
4.1 An equilibrium for symmetric hospitals
Next I will solve for an equilibrium with symmetric hospitals where equilibrium signals are
ignored.6 As is common, I assume that when receiving two uninformative signals, patients
are equally likely to visit one of the hospitals.
In order to find q∗, consider what happens if hospital j deviates to a quality qj 6= q∗. If
qj > q
∗, then some patients will receive signals in the interval (q∗ + 1/2v, qj + 1/2v], that
should never be observed in equilibrium. These patients should conclude that hospital
j has deviated from its equilibrium strategy. If so, patients with signals in the interval
(q∗ + 1/2v, qj + 1/2v] have to update their beliefs about quality of hospital j. The only
way to do so is to believe that hospital j has chosen a quality higher than q∗. So these
patients will buy from hospital j with probability one. The opposite holds for qj < q
∗ for
patients who receive signals in the interval [qj − 1/2v, q∗− 1/2v), who surely buy from the
other hospital.
4For example, if hospitals have a fixed cost, then the hospital with zero quality would leave the market.
5For off-equilibrium signals patients may be required to chose one of the hospitals.
6In GS equilibrium for symmetric hospitals, patients follow the highest signal even though it does not
change their belief about quality.
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Given the above, if hospital j chooses a quality qj , its demand is given by
Dj(qj , q
∗) =

0 if qj ∈ [0, q∗ − 1/v)
1+v(qj−q∗)
2 if qj ∈ [q∗ − 1/v, q∗ + 1/v]
1 if qj ∈ (q∗ + 1/v,∞]
Using the above, the profit is
Πj(qj , q
∗) = (p− c)Dj(qj , q∗)− 1
2
δjq
2
j .
Since in equilibrium we should have qj = q
∗, q∗ should satisfy the following first order
condition
q∗ =
(p− c)v
2δj
. (1)
From the above, it is immediately obvious that because q∗ is the same for the two hos-
pitals, an equilibrium where patients are equally likely to visit either hospital regardless
of their signals cannot be constructed for δL > δH . Thus, if one where to construct an
equilibrium for this case, patients should respond to signals in such a way that both hos-
pitals find q∗ to be optimal. Given that their costs differ, such a construction if inherently
very difficult, if not impossible.
The condition in (1) is necessary but not sufficient. It can be the case that q∗ is so
large that hospital j may deviate to qj = 0. This is a profitable deviation if (p−c)v2 > 4δ,
in which case Πj(p∗, p∗) < 0. So q∗ in (1) cannot be an equilibrium quality, but given that
(1) is necessary for equilibrium, there can be no pure strategy PBE.
Proposition 1. Pure strategy PBE does not exist if (p− c)v2 > 4δ.
Proof. In a pure strategy PBE condition (1) has to hold, or otherwise hospital j can
increase profits by setting qj different from q
∗. If (p − c)v2 > 4δ, then equilibrium profit
of hospital j is negative. Then j can set qj = 0 and guarantee itself a zero profit. Thus if
(p− c)v2 > 4δ pure strategy symmetric PBE does not exist.
Next I characterize pure strategy symmetric PBE if it exists.
Proposition 2. If δH = δL = δ and (p− c)v2 ≤ 4δ, in the pure strategy PBE
q∗H = q
∗
L =
(p− c)v
2δ
As in GS, equilibrium quality increases with the markup, decreases in v and δ. One has
to be very cautious with such comparative statics, however. Since the game has multiple
equilibria, unless one is very confident in the choice of particular equilibrium, comparative
statics cannot be performed. This is because when a parameter changes, patients and
hospitals can switch to a different type of equilibrium, thus the direction of comparative
statics may be arbitrary (e.g. quality may be increasing or decreasing in v depending on
which equilibria are selected as v changes).
5
5 Discussion
The idea that noisy information may be discarded by rational decision-makers is not
new. Bagwell (1995) and Maggi (1999) have shown that when a player (e.g. Stackelberg
follower) observes another player’s (Stackelberg leader’s) move with noise, the leader loses
the first-mover advantage. This is because the follower never uses noisy signal and thus
reacts to what she thinks the leader did and not to what the leader actually did. In fact,
Maggi (1999) in footnote 3 writes:
“Also, consider the simplest problem of moral hazard in the provision of product
quality. If consumers cannot observe the quality of the product before purchasing (and
there are no repeat purchases or warranties), firms have incentive to provide low quality,
and a ”lemons” problem arises (see Tirole (1988) for a survey of this literature). The
irrelevance result implies that even if consumers do observe quality before purchasing, but
with a slight noise, the (pure-strategy) equilibrium outcome is the same as if they did not
observe quality at all, hence the lemons problem may not be resolved.”
Maggi’s reasoning relies on the independence of signal’s support from quality choice.
For example, if signals have unbounded support (e.g. Normal distribution), then Maggi’s
conjecture is correct. To avoid this problem, Shelegia (2011), who uses Normally dis-
tributed signals in a model of quality choice similar to GS, assumes that quality realiza-
tions differ across consumers, so even if consumer knows firm’s quality choice, signals are
still informative about her idiosyncratic realization of quality. Shelegia (2011) proceeds
to show that equilibrium quality increases in the precision of consumers’ signals. In GS,
signals have bounded support (uniform), so Maggi’s conjecture does not hold, and that is
why for symmetric firms positive quality can be sustained. It is however, still true that
GS’s equilibrium is only valid for symmetric firms, or otherwise some rational consumers
make wrong choices based on irrelevant information.
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